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DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A THEORY FOR "JUST" DIVISION OF
MARITAL PROPERTY IN MISSOURI
JOAN M. KRAusKoPF
I. INTRODUCTION
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation the
Missouri Divorce Reform Act provides that "the court shall set apart to
each spouse his property and shall divide the marital property in such
proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors."'
What pole stars are there for a court seeking to divide the property as it
"deems just"? What principles guide its exercise of discretion so that it
will not be abused? The statute lists only four relevant factors. 2 No basic
principles are stated. No published legislative history reveals the back-
ground of this statute. The power to divide marital property and even
the concept of marital property are new in Missouri law. Therefore, prior
decisions cannot form a discretionary framework.
However, statutes do not appear with the complexity and thoroughness
of this section without a background. That background reveals two major
guiding principles inherent in the statute: first, property division should
reflect the concept of marriage as a shared enterprise similar to a partner-
ship; and, second, property division should be utilized as a means of pro-
viding future support for an economically dependent spouse.
II. MARIAGE AS A SHARED ENTERPRIsE
A. The Partnership Theory of Marriage
The original Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act was approved by
the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in August, 1970.3 The following win-
ter Senator Albert Spradling, who was himself a Commissioner, introduced
into the Missouri legislature a modified form of the Uniform Act.4 The
1 Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia, A.B., Ohio University,
1954, J.D. Ohio State University, 1957.
1. § 452.330.1, RSMo 1973 Supp.
2. The factors as set forth in section 452.330.1, RSMo 1973 Supp., are:(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable
periods to the spouse having custody of any children; and
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage.
3. HANDBOOK or NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COINIMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
LAws 111 (1970) (hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK); FAILY LAw REPORTER, DEsK
GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr 1 (1974) (hereinafter cited
as DraK GuIDE).
4. S.B. 11, Seventy-sixth General Assembly; Public Information Committee,
The Missouri Bar, Press Release, Feb. 2, 1971; Thayer, Dissolution of Marriage
Under Missouri's New Divorce Law: Introduction, 29 J. Mo. B. 496, 497-98 (1973).
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Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar endorsed this bill. The property
division section was identical to that in the Uniform Act.5 The succeeding
year, after a similar bill failed, the Family Law Committee of the Missouri
Bar worked to eliminate the criticisms of the Uniform Act.6 The product
of their work became the Divorce Reform Act,7 which was sponsored by
Representatives Harold Holliday and Richard Martin in the House and by
Senator Spradling in the Senate.8 The property division section of this
Act, as finally passed in 1973, is almost the same as the 1970 Uniform ActY
The Commissioners stated that their "original proposal [for the di-
vision of property in the Uniform Act] was in substance ... a community
property rule."'10 The Act's definition of marital property 1 corresponds to
that of community property in the eight community property jurisdic-
tions.12 The same system for classifying marital and separate property can
be traced back to the earliest laws of Spain.'8
-Why would the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Laws, composed principally of persons from common law states, recommend
a community property model for property division at divorce? The Com-
missioners did not wish to foist the entire community property regime
upon common law jurisdictions, but they did want to incorporate the
shared enterprise or partnership theory of marriage-the heart of com-
munity.property law-as a major guiding principle in dividing property at
divorce. Because marriage, as another study group wrote, "is a partner-
ship to which each spouse makes a different but equally important contri-
bution,"' 4 the Commissioners recommended that the "distribution of prop-
5. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 807 (1970), quoted in HANDBOOK,
supra note 3, at 220 (hereinafter cited as UMDA HANDBOOK).
6. Thayer, supra note 4, at 498.
7. H.B. .315, Seventy-seventh General Assembly; §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo
1973 Supp.
8. Thayer;supra note'4, at 498.
9. The major modification is the reference to the conduct of the parties
in the Missouri statute. See statute quoted note 2 supra; UMDA HANDBOOK, supra
note 3, at 220.
10. DESK GUIDE, supra note 3, at 57.
11. Section 452.330.2, RSMo 1973 Supp., and section 307 of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 220, both define "marital
property" as:
all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) Property' acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to
the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise or descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
12. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COIaIuNIrY PROPERTY 114-23(1971) (hereinafter cited as DEFUNiAK & VAUGHN).
18. Id. at 8-10.
14. Professor Robert Levy of the University of Minnesota prepared a pre-
liminary analysis of existing divorce laws and suggested issues for the consider-
ation of the Commissioners. He began his analysis of property provisions with
the statement quoted in the text from the report of the 1963 Committee on
[Vol. 41
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erty upon the termination of marriage should be treated, as nearly as
possible, like the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a [busi-
ness] partnership."' 5
The underlying premises of marriage as a partnership are thoroughly
described in the standard work on community property by DeFuniak and
Vaughn. 16 The theory of community property is that "with respect to
marital property acquisitions, the marriage is a community of which each
spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry to its pros-
perity."'1 7 In the community property states it is expected that "during
marriage the time and attention of husband and wife should be directed
toward furthering the goals-economic, moral, social-of the marriage."' Is
Property acquired during the marriage is community property
because it is acquired by the labor and industry of members of a
form of partnership, that is, a marital partnership ... and what-
ever is earned or gained by one marital partner during the exist-
ence of the marital partnership must accrue to the benefit of both
marital partners.' 9
B. Defects of the Common Law Approach
There is widespread dissatisfaction with the common law principles
governing property division at marriage dissolution. A number of studies,
including those by Professor Levy for the Commissioners on Uniform
Laws, 20 the President's Commission on the Status of Women,21 and the
Law Commission of Great Britain,2 2 have pointed out the shortcomings of
the common law approach. Under the common law no property rights
arise during marriage by virtue of the marriage itself. Since the Married
Women's Property Acts were enacted giving the wife control over her
separate property, there has been a complete separation of assets. Only at
death, through dower, curtesy and, more recently, statutory forced shares,
does one spouse acquire any interest in the property of the other by opera-
tion of law. Although this law of property during marriage and at death
has its adherents23 and critics,24 the Commissioners and the Missouri legis-
Civil and Political Rights of the President's Commission on the Status of Women.
See R. LEVY, UNIFORMf MARRIAGE AND DIVoRCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS 164 (1968) (hereinafter cited as LEvY).
15. HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 178. See also Glendon, Power and Authority
in the Family: New Legal Patterns as Reflections of Changing Ideologies, 23 AN.
J. Comp. L. 1, 23 (1975).
16. DEFUNIAK S. VAUGHN, supra note 12.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 128.
20. LEVY, supra note 14, at 135-40.
21. REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF THE PRFSI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF W1oMEN (1963).
22. LAW CoMMIssIoN or GREAT BRITAIN, PUBLIC WORKING PAPER No. 42,
FAMILY PROPERTY LAW (1971) (hereinafter cited as LAw Co1-MISSION).
23. Rheinstein, The Transformation of Marriage and the Law, 68 Nw. U.L.
REv. 463 (1973).
24. Karowe, Marital Property: A New Look at Old Inequities, 39 ALBANY
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lature were concerned solely with issues at the time of divorce.2 5 At that
moment the common law recognized no property interests by virtue of the
marriage alone. In the absence of a statute, the courts of many states,
including Missouri, had no power to order transfers or divisions of prop-
erty. For those couples who had titled their property jointly an equal di-
vision at divorce took place. Although equal division in those circumstances
could sometimes be unfair, at least the parties had created the situation by
choice.
Real inequities can exist when the property is titled only in the name
of the wage-earning husband because, as one commentator has -written,
the common law system emphasizes the
fortuitous or calculated taking of title and ignores the wife's con-
tributions to the family.... The wife may contribute to the family
by sharing the bread-winner role with her husband, by being a
housewife and mother, or by combining such functions. At least
when the family is a functioning unit, the wife's contributions
should be regarded as equal to those of the husband, whether they
consist exclusively of services in the home or also involve supple-
menting the family income.2 6
Professor Levy, in writing for the Commissioners, agreed with this analysis.
He pointed out:
[T]he wife who spends almost all her married life in homemaking
and child rearing contributes significantly to the family's economic
welfare by making it possible for the husband to earn income and
amass property during the marriage .... 27
The common law system is based on the assumption that the wife's
place is in the home.28 Although it fosters the homemaker's role as proper
and necessary, the common law provides no economic reward for the wife's
contributions to the family assets or for her lost opportunity to develop
earning power outside the home. The system ignores the fact that the wife's
entire economic worth is absorbed into the marital unit.2 0 The wife, as
one author states,
will have no earnings during [the marriage] nor the prospect of
L. REv. 52 (1974); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to
an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974).
25. The definition of marital property is "[flor purposes of sections 452.300
to 452.415 only." § 452.330.2, RSMo 1973 Supp.
26. Foster, Preface, in I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY xiii (1973).
27. LEvY, supra note 14, at 165, citing Spheeris v. Spheeris, 37 Wis.2d 497,
155 N.W.2d 130 (1967).
28. Daggett, Division of Property Upon Dissolution of the Marriage, 6 LAw
& CONTE-P. PROB. 225 (1939); Karowe, supra note 24, at 73; Krauskopf & Thomas,
supra note 24, at 582-84; Kulzer, Property and the Family, Spousal Protection,
4 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 195, 215-17 (1973); Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties
Between Husband and Wife, 9 VAND. L. REv. 709 (1956).
29. Johnston, Tax and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law
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making any when the marriage ends. The law's treatment of her,
although equal to that accorded her husband, does not put her on
a par with him-he, in fact, earns.30
To redress this imbalance, the Law Commission of Great Britain in
1971 recommended:
that the law should step in, and ensure that each spouse is entitled
to a share in certain family property, irrespective of which spouse
acquired it. This... would acknowledge the partnership element
in marriage and would do no more than extend to the relatively
uncommon case of the family which needs the support of the law
the practice of happy family life.31
A Missouri case illustrates the injustice likely to occur when the court
has no power to control disposition of the property by the husband or to
order any of it transferred to the wife. In State ex rel. George v. Mitchell 32
a wife sued for divorce, alleging that personal property in the possession of
the husband (including livestock, farm equipment, household furniture,
and "one large lot of canned fruit") had been "acquired by and through
the joint efforts of plaintiff and defendant during their married life to-
gether."33 She asked that her husband be temporarily enjoined from dis-
posing of this property to prevent him from "fraudulently depriving plain-
tiff of her rights therein as the wife of defendant." 34 The court refused the
injunction, stating that the only rights she had in her husband's personal
property were those which would materialize upon his demise. The court
did not even discuss the possibility that she might have acquired some in-
terest in this property, but assumed it all belonged to the husband.3 5 Even
if she could later obtain an order for gross alimony she would have to take
her chances along with other judgment creditors in enforcing it.
Another objectionable feature of the common law approach is of grow-
ing importance as more women become wage earners-it ignores the wife's
actual financial contribution to the acquisition of family assets titled solely
in the husband's name. Over one-third of married women living with their
husbands work outside the home and many more work at one time during
their marriage.36 The few existing empirical studies of family financial
affairs indicate that spouses use their incomes interchangeably for family
support and expenditures. 37
30. Younger, Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum,
48 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 211, 213 (1973).
31. LAw Co-lAnssioN, supra note 22, at 8.
82. 230 S.W.2d 117 (Spr. Mo. App. 1950).
33. Id. at 118.
34. Id.
35. The usual common law presumption is that the husband owns all the
household property. DiFlorido v. DeFlorido, 331 A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. 1975). However,
in DiFlorido the court held that the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment pre-
vented application of that "one-sided presumption" and it presumed joint owner-
ship in the absence of other evidence. Id. at 179.
36. Lxvy, supra note 14, at 165.
37. A. JAcoBs & R. ANGFELL, A RsEARcH IN FA-mIY LA W 469 (1930).
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Nevertheless, these contributions, both direct and indirect, are often
not recognized by common law courts at the time of divorce. For example, a
New York court recently held that it was bound to follow the rigid title
theory even though the wife presented evidence of her financial contribu-
tions to the family assets, all of which were titled solely in the husband's
name.38 The court explained that determining interests solely on title
often led to harsh results both for wife and husband, and that the parties
would be better served if the court had the power to award lump sum ali-
mony or distribute assets without regard to title. This result illustrates why
Levy pointed out: "It is unfair to deny divorce judges authority to parcel
out what can only be considered the family's property-even if one of the
spouses is formally listed as the property's owner."3 0 His suggestion to the
Commissioners was that both service and financial contributions to the
acquisition of assets should be considered if the Uniform Act embodied a
conception of marriage as a partnership enterprise. The Act could then
direct the trial judge's attention to considerations more relevant to the
division of property than the technical state of the title.
Another factor that impelled the Commissioners' decision to give
courts power to divide property upon divorce is also related to the
shared enterprise concept. Although often unstated, there was a widespread
recognition among members of the bar that fault considerations, par-
ticularly the defense of recrimination, gave wives settlement leverage for
obtaining a share of the property which they helped to amass during
the marriage. 40 Indeed, it is probable that fault regimes "have persisted
because they tend to equalize the bargaining positions of divorcing husbands
and wives." 41 To remove those doctrines without also giving the courts
the power to divide property would reflect a disastrous lack of appreciation
for the contributions of the non-working spouse.
38. Popper v. Popper, N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1975). A similar
New York decision in 1970 indicated no sympathy for the wife whose earnings
had been devoted to the family for almost 40 years but whose husband was held
entitled to all investments because they were titled in his name. The court
remarked that what the wife "really seeks is a community property division under
the guise of equitable relief." Fischer v. Wirth, 38 App. Div. 2d 611, 326 N.Y.S.2d
308 (1971).
39. LEvy, supra note 14, at 165. Levy criticizes the "unreal presumptions
and petty distinctions" to which courts have resorted to determine property
interests using resulting trust and presumption of gift theories. Id. at 165 n.358.
For Missouri law, see Nelson, Purchase-Money Resulting Trusts in Land in Mis-
souri, 33 Mo. L. REv. 552, 567-94 (1968).
40. Those present at the hearings in the Missouri legislature on various
"no-fault divorce bills may recall witnesses testifying that they feared "easy
divorce" would result in great injustice to the faithful housewife of many years
and that, therefore, divorce against her will by a less than innocent spouse
would be wrong. This concern was so strong in England that its Divorce Reform
Act permits the court to refuse a divorce if it would cause economic hardship to
the respondent. Divorce Reform Act 1969, c. 55, § 4 (1); Matrimonial Causes Act
1973, c. 18.
41. LEvY, supra note 14, at 165.
(Vol. 41
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For example, in Stauffer v. Stauffer4 2 a 65-year-old crippled wife sued
for separate maintenance. The court described the 33-year marriage as
"an American saga of hard work, frugality, and accumulation." 43 They
operated a farm on which the wife cooked and washed for hired hands,
worked in the fields, and even helped to clear land. Through their
joint labors, they acquired land and personalty worth half a million
dollars-all titled in the husband's name alone. The wife obtained a
separate maintenance order for a meager $5,600 a year.44
Under the fault system Mrs. Stauffer might have been able to prevent
a divorce with the defense of recrimination until a settlement produced
a fair division of the assets. By preventing a divorce entirely, she would
be able to obtain at least her statutory forced share of her husband's
property if he died first. But under a "no fault" divorce system, without
court power to divide property or without the shared enterprise theory
to guide a court with that power, Mrs. Stauffer would have no title to
show for her lifelong investment and no assurance of future support more
secure than that of an ordinary judgment creditor.
C. Acceptance of the Partnership Theory
The Commissioners' desire to inculcate partnership concepts of mar-
riage into the common law is not an aberration peculiar to them. Indeed,
it is such a widespread and current value that it is fair to assume that
the Missouri legislature also had that intent in enacting the Uniform Act
section. The notion is alive, well, and growing by leaps and bounds,
not only in the United 'States, but in many other countries as well. As
early as 1959, a German writer said that throughout the western world
it is generally recognized that the family is a sociological unit, and
the work of the housewife is to be remunerated on a level with
the professional work of the husband, whatever it may be, to
balance the natural inequalities in the economic functions of
husband and wife. The social developments of the past decades
have strengthened the necessities towards the wife's just, clear
and solid economic share in the gains made by the husband during
marriage. Since it is a fact that even working-class families store'
up considerable savings and invest large sums of money in houses,
cars, furniture, clothing, furs, television, etc., the economic par-
ticipation of the spouses has been paid more and more attention.45
Research indicates that divorcing persons commonly agree to divide
their property equally.46 Various study commissions have concluded that
42. 313 S.W.2d 597 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
43. Id. at 598.
44. Id. at 602.
45. Muller-Freienfels, Equality of Husband and Wife in Family Law, 8 INT.
: Comp. L.Q. 249, 261 (1959).
46. Hopson, The Economics of a Divorce: A Pilot Empirical Study at the
Trial Court Level, 11 KAN. L. REv. 107 (1962). The small number of cases in-
1976]
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the traditional common law approach to property acquired by the spouses
during marriage is no longer acceptable.47 Finally, the past few years have
witnessed a deluge of law review articles critical of the failure of legis-
latures and courts to recognize the shared enterprise nature of marriage
in dealing with family property.48
Particularly strong evidence of acceptance of this value is the legis-
lation passed both in the United States and elsewhere which reflects
concern for more equitable division of family assets. Several continental
countries have created a system of equal division of the increase in assets
during marriage.49 English courts have recently received the power to
divide property even where it is titled only in one spouse's name.50
Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, and Arizona, in addition to Missouri,
have passed property division sections modeled on the Uniform
Act.51 The New Jersey legislature has given its courts the power to
divide all property acquired during marriage, without regard to its
source.52 The New Jersey Supreme Court declared that although the
statute did not necessarily adopt community property principles, 3 it
seeks to right what many have felt to be a grave wrong. It gives
recognition to the essential supportive role played by the wife in
the home, acknowledging that as homemaker, wife and mother
she should clearly be entitled to a share of family assets accumu-
lated during the marriage. Thus the division of property upon
divorce is responsive to the concept that marriage is a shared
enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a
partnership. Only if it is clearly understood that far more than
vestigated in this study explains its description as a "pilot" study and renders its
findings only tentative. More field research is needed to determine how divorcing
persons actually divide their property.
47. PRrSIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF Com-
MrrrEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 18 (1963); CrrzEN's ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND
POLICY 5 (1968); REPORT OF CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
20, 6 4 (1974); 3 ONTARIO LAw REFORM COMMISSION 506 (1969); LAw Com[-
MISSION, supra note 22.
48. Foster & Freed, Marital Property Reform in New York, 8 FAM. L.Q. 169
(1974); Johnston, supra note 29; Karowe, supra note 24; Kay, Making Marriage
and Divorce Safe for Women, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1683 (1972); Krauskopf & Thomas,
supra note 24; Kulzer, supra note 28; Rheinstein, supra note 23; Weitzman, Legal
Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (1974).
49. C. Civ. art. 1400-91, 1569-80 (1965) (France); Law of June 18, 1957
(West Germany). For explanations of the French community and the German
and Scandanavian deferred communities, see Foster & Freed, supra note 48; Glen-
don, supra note 15; Rheinstein, supra note 23.
50. Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 c. 45, § 4, codified in
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 c. 18, § 24 (1).
51. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46.1-13 (1972); KrY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (Supp. 1975).
52. N.J. R.Ev. STAT. § 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1975).
53. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
[Vol. 41
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economic factors are involved, will the resulting distribution be
equitable within the true intent and meaning of the statute.54
The influence of the movement toward reliance upon partnership
marriage principles has been reflected also in the court decisions of those
common law states which have long had power to divide property, or
to order gross alimony. For example, prior to the passage of the Uniform
Act in Kentucky, its courts already had expanded by judicial decision
their power to divide all property acquired during the marriage "ac-
cording to what is just and reasonable." 55 The court treated property
obtained during the marriage as acquired by "team effort" whether the
wife was a wage earner and homemaker, confined her activities to home-
making exclusively, or worked actively as a business associate with her
husband. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently awarded a homemaker
48 percent of the couple's property, 56 relying on its own leading case of
Lacey v. Lacey57 for the proposition that marriage "is literally a partner-
ship, although a partnership in which contributions and equities of the
partners may and do differ from individual case to individual case."5 8
The court added,
The contribution of a full-time homemaker-housewife to the
marriage may well be greater or at least as great as those of the
wife required by circumstances or electing by preference to seek
-and secure outside employment. 59
Oklahoma60 and Nebraska61 courts have characterized orders for the
payment of substantial lump sums of money to the wife as divisions of
property based on her contributions to her husband's earning power by
helping pay his way through professional school.
D. Limitations on the Power to Divide Property
The Uniform Act and the Missouri Divorce Reform Act allow only
the division of "marital property." The court's power to divide property
was not extended to all property (including separate property) owned
by the spouses because the shared enterprise or partnership theory is
inherently applicable only to property acquired during the marriage
through the efforts of the spouses. Limiting the class of divisible property
emphasizes the intent to adopt partnership principles, but it also raises
potential problems.
The ABA Family Law Section opposed this provision of the Uniform
Act because it feared the necessity of using complex and unfamiliar
54. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 501 (1974).
55. Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d 821, 826-27 (Ky. 1970).
56. Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d 744, 229 N.W.2d 629 (1975).
57. 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970).
58. Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Wis. 2d at ____, 229 N.W.2d at 634 (1975).
59. Id.
60. Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1974).
61. Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
1976]
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community property principles to distinguish between marital and separate
property.62 As a result, the amended Uniform Act offers alternative
sections.63 Alternative A permits the division of all property. Alternative
B is the former marital property section modified for use in community
property states. The Family Law Section apparently hoped to protect
the homemaker through a statutory presumption that "each spouse made
a substantial contribution to the acquisition of income and property
while they were living together as husband and wife." 64 Unfortunately,
this language was deleted from the final draft without explanation.
Introduction of technical community property doctrines to identify
divisible property may indeed accomplish little and lead to some unjust
results in common law jurisdictions which already allow division of all
property.6 5 However, there is a noticeable propensity in the courts of
those states to make strikingly similar distinctions between "separate"
and "marital" property, and to award the separate property to the
appropriate spouse.66 There seems to be a basic feeling that it is indeed
equitable to give back to each spouse the property he acquired before
the marriage or by gifts during the marriage. To this extent, the dis-
advantages of the limitation to marital property are insignificant. Most
of the separate property issues litigated under Alternative B may arise
anyway under Alternative A in the context of what is an "equitable"
division of all the property. If Missouri courts adopt the partnership theory,
the apparently technical scheme of section 452.330 will have accomplished
its purpose without needless complexity.
62. Podell, The Case for Revision of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
18 S.D.L. REv. 601, 607 (1973). However, the Law Commission of England after
studying various community and deferred community systems concluded that such
arguments against a community property regime should not be determinative. It
said that the question to be decided was "whether it would lead to a greater
measure of justice to give effect to the idea that marriage is a partnership, by
sharing the assets acquired during the marriage, regardless of which spouse con-
tributed to their acquisition. This question cannot be avoided on the ground
that community is too difficult." LAw CoMuIssioN, supra note 22, at 310.
63. UNIFORMV MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACr § 307 (1973); HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM LAWs 286, 312 (1973); DESK
GUIDE, supra note 3, at 32.
64. Proposed Revised Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307, 7 FAAr. L.Q.
135, 152 (1973).
65. Judge Ralph Podell of Milwaukee, Wisconsin was the leading spokesman
for the Family Law Section. The supreme court of his state is one of those
few common law jurisdictions already clearly adopting partnership marriage
concepts; therefore, it has little to gain from the marital property limits. Judge
Podell pointed out that a woman would be relegated to relying on alimony alone
if the husband owned assets worth ten million dollars which all were acquired
prior to the marriage. This may seem inequitable to a wife of a 35-year marriage,
but it certainly prevents fortune hunters from marrying solely to obtain a
chance at the assets after a relatively short period. The inequity could be reduced
by modifying the statute, as was done in Colorado, to include in marital
property the increase in value of property owned prior to marriage. CoLo. REv.
STAT ANN. § 46-10-113 (4) (1972).
66. See Note, Property, Maintenance, and Child Support Decrees Under the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L. Ruv. 558, 566 (1973).
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A last significant question concerning the shared enterprise nature
of marriage as a guiding principle is: Why did not the Commissioners or
the Missouri legislature simply require an equal division of the marital
property unless the parties agreed otherwise? That would be the solution
to division of the profits and surplus of a business partnership,67 and
it is advocated strongly by some partnership marriage devotees. 68 In
his recommendations to the Commissioners, Professor Levy said that prop-
erty division should serve not only to protect capital contributions but
also to permit courts to recognize that the parties were partners.6 9 How-
ever, he opposed mandatory equal division because he recognized that
legislatures may believe that there are socially desirable considerations
other than equality-e.g, the conduct of the parties during the marriage,
7 °
relevant to a just division of property. The Task Force on Family Law
and Policy of the Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women
pointed out that not only are both parties present to show their respective
contributions to the family assets but also the duration of marriage,
economic circumstances, or age of the parties may be such that a fixed
equal division would not be fair.7 1 The Commissioners deemed the
most socially important consideration the economic dependency or self-
sufficiency of the spouses. 72 An automatic equal division of property
would ignore that factor entirely.
III. DIvisioN OF PROPERTY AS A FoRm OF SUPPORT
The second major guiding principle which Missouri courts should
follow in determining a "just" division of marital property is the need
for future support by the spouses. The Commissioners stated they in-
tended the courts to use property division "as the primary means of
providing for the future financial needs of the spouses." 78 This function
was justified by the New Jersey Supreme Court as follows:
Hitherto future financial support for a divorced wife has been
available only by grant of alimony. Such support has always
been inherently precarious. It ceases upon the death of the former
husband and will cease or falter upon his experiencing financial
misfortune disabling him from continuing his regular payments.
This may result in serious misfortune to the wife and in some
cases will compel her to become a public charge. An allocation
67. § 358.180(1), RSMo 1969 (Uniform Partnership Law).
68. Foster & Freed, supra note 48.
69. LEVY, supra note 14, at 365 n.357.
70. § 352.330.1 (4), RSMo 1973 Supp.
71. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY OF THE CITIZEN'S
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 5 (1968).
72. Id.
73. HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 178. This comment refers to the property
division section of the 1970 Uniform Act. The 1973 amendment to the Uniform
Act required a change in the prefatory note to indicate that all property of either
spouse would be divided to provide needed support. See HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIiFOP.,,i LAws 284 (1973).
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of property to the wife at the time of the divorce is at least some
protection against such an eventuality.74
The situation is especially acute for the older dependent wife whose
husband is about to retire with all the property, except perhaps the
marital home, titled in his name. She will no longer have the bargain-
ing edge of recrimination to prevent the divorce and will lose fringe
benefits such as medical coverage and the spouse's share under his re-
tirement plan.7 5 A woman of her generation has very likely developed
no earnings skills because she has devoted herself to homemaking during
their marriage. The combination of this woman's contributions and needs
may be such that a "just" division of the marital property would be to
award nearly all to her. Because the incidence of divorce among older
persons has increased substantially, it is appropriate that special concern
be evidenced for the older, economically dependent woman. However,
the economic disadvantages of both spouses should always be considered,
For example, the court should bear in mind whether this wife, as is
true of most women, has less earning capacity than men, whether this
husband is in fact unskilled or incapacitated, and whether there is sufficient
property to allow the custodian of the children to remain home with them.
The second and third factors in § 452.330.1 require the court to consider all
separate property and economic circumstances.
IV. EQUAL DIVISION AS STARTING POINT
It is clear that neither 'the Uniform Act nor the Missouri statute
requires an equal division of marital property and that both would allow
an equal division. There is a question whether any particular percentage
division should be used as a starting point. Most common law jurisdictions
having the power to divide all property have rejected starting point
percentages in the past.7 6 Recent cases in those jurisdictions-even in
states amenable to partnership notions-continue to reject starting points.7
A court having the power to divide all property of either spouse
without regard to its source should not utilize a starting point percentage.
The major reason for awarding one spouse's separate property to the
other spouse is to satisfy the latter's economic needs. Requiring the owner
of separate property to overcome a starting point presumption would
be like including all of a business partner's individually owned property
in the partnership assets unless he could affirmatively show that it was
74. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. at 228-29, 320 A.2d at 501; accord,
Wqoliner v. Woliner, 132 N.J. Super. 216, 333 A.2d 283 (1975).
75. However, she will be entitled to Social Security benefits on his earnings
record if they were married twenty years and he continues to contribute to her
support. 42 U.S.C. § 416 (d) (1) (1974).
76. See cases cited in 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 295 (1959).
77. In re Briggs, 225 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1975); In re Cooper, 225 N.W.2d
915 (Iowa 1975); Cook v. Cook, 495 P.2d 591 (Mont. 1972); Durfee v. Durfee, 465
P.2d 161 (Okla. 1970); Lacey v. Lacey, 173 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 1970).
[Vol. 41
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/2
1976] DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 177
not acquired in the course of the partnership business. The partnership
principle is irrelevant to separate property, and it is thus inherently unfair
to apply an equal division starting point in this situation. The spouse
claiming a share of the other's separate property should be forced to
establish his need without the aid of starting point percentages.
Community property states, even where an equal final division is not
required, have adopted an equal division as a starting point.78 When
the court is dealing only with the assets obtained due to the effort and
industry of the parties during the marriage, a starting point percentage is
justified. A 50-50 starting point reflects the basic partnership assumption
of equality, but allows other relevant considerations, if established, to
influence an unequal division.
States such as Missouri with a common law background whose
statutes limit the division of property to that acquired during the marriage
(other than by gift, devise, or inheritance) are in neither group.7 9
Whether the courts of Missouri, Kentucky, Colorado, or Maine will de-
velop equal division of the marital property as a starting point depends
upon how strongly they embrace the concept that assets acquired by
the labor and industry of the spouses should be viewed as the assets of
a marital partnership.8 0 The partnership concept of marriage would be
given primary value by selecting equal division of marital property as
a starting point. Divergence from the presumption would depend upon
the strength of other relevant factors such as actual contributions, economic
need, and conduct of the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri courts are now engaged in the process of giving content to
the legislative direction to make a "just" division of property upon dis-
solution of marriage. In developing judicial guidelines to implement the
statute, the courts should recognize that the partnership theory of mar-
riage is the fundamental tenet underlying the property division section
of the Divorce Reform Act.
The concept of marriage as a shared enterprise is a much needed
departure from the common law system, and remedies many of its
deficiencies. For example, by using shared enterprise considerations Mis-
souri courts may now take account of contributions of all types-by the
homemaker as well as the wage earner-to the accumulation of the family's
78. Hatch v. Hatch, 23 Ariz. App. 487, 534 P.2d 295 (1975); Thomas v.
Thomas, 525 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
79. New Jersey finds itself in a truly unique situation. The supreme court
has held that property acquired prior to marriage is not subject to division, but
that all property acquired during the marriage, including that acquired by gift
or inheritance, is subject to division. Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. at 217, 320 A.2d
at 480.
80. The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected a starting point percentage be-
fore its new property division statute was enacted. Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d
821 (Ky. 1970).
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assets. The introduction of the marital property concept into Missouri
law should have a beneficial result in protecting spouses from the pos-
sibly dire consequences of titling in one spouse's name property which
was acquired during the marriage by the joint effort of both.81
Although the division of marital property is analogous to the division
of assets at the dissolution of a business partnership, the statute permits
the court the necessary flexibility to adjust the property division ac-
cording to the actual economic needs of the parties. This not only com-
pensates for the loss of fault defenses as a bargaining tool, but also
provides a more secure future for the economically dependent spouse.
Recognition of the partnership theory of marriage will put Missouri
into the mainstream of the increasing national and international acceptance
of the fact that marriage, as practiced by most persons, is literally a
partnership. The intelligent use of the partnership principle will enable
the court to fulfill its duty to make a "just" division of property.
81. Recognition of the partnership nature of marriage may have significant
tax advantages. In United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), the Supreme Court
held that the transfer of appreciated property to the wife pursuant to a di-
vorce settlement resulted in a taxable gain to the husband. Under the applicable
state law, Mrs. Davis had no interest in the property before the transfer. The re-
sult in Missouri before the enactment of section 452.330 would clearly have been
the same. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
A recent decision considered the effect of CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-13
(Supp. 1971), which is modeled, like the Missouri statute, on section 307 of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court
opinion holding that a judicial division of appreciated property in Colorado did
not fall within the Davis rule. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975),
aff'g 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974). The lower court had certified to the Colo-
rado Supreme Court the question of the nature of the wife's property interest, if
any, in marital property titled solely in the husband's name. The state court held:
[A]t the time the divorce action was filed there vested in the wife her
interest in the property in the name of the husband [by virtue of the
statute].
[T]he transfer involved here was a recognition of a species of common
ownership of the marital estate by the wife resembling a division of prop-
erty between co-owners.
In re Questions Submitted by United States District Court, 517 P.2d 1331, 1332,
1334 (Colo. 1974). Although the consequences of the property division were con.
sidered under the prior Colorado statute, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-5 (1963), the
district court indicated its belief that the Uniform Act section was "nothing more
than a legislative recognition of pre-existing Colorado law." Imel v. United States,
375 F. Supp. at 1113-15 & n.11. Imel suggests that predictions that the Missouri
property division section would not avoid the Davis rule are overly pessimistic. See,
e.g., Gunn, The Federal Income Tax Effects of the Missouri Version of the Uniform
Divorce Act, 62 WAsII. U.L.Q. 227 (1974).
[Vol. 41
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/2
